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ABSTRACT
A Role-based Access Control (RBAC) mechanism prevents unau-
thorized users to perform an operation, according to authorization
policies which are defined on the user’s role within an enterprise.
Several models have been proposed to specify complex RBAC poli-
cies. However, existing approaches for policy enforcement do not
fully support all the types of policies that can be expressed in these
models, which hinders their adoption among practitioners.
In this paper we propose a model-driven enforcement framework
for complex policies captured byGemRBAC+CTX, a comprehensive
RBAC model proposed in the literature. We reduce the problem
of making an access decision to checking whether a system state
(from an RBAC point of view), expressed as an instance of the Gem-
RBAC+CTX model, satisfies the constraints corresponding to the
RBAC policies to be enforced at run time. We provide enforcement
algorithms for various types of access requests and events, and a
prototype tool (MORRO) implementing them. We also show how
to integrate MORRO into an industrial Web application. The evalu-
ation results show the applicability of our approach on a industrial
system and its scalability with respect to the various parameters
characterizing an AC configuration.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Access control; • Software and its
engineering→Model-driven software engineering;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Access control (AC) systems have been used to restrict a user to
access critical resources within an enterprise. One of the most used
AC models is Role-based Access Control (RBAC), which allows a
user to access a resource or to perform an operation based on her
role, e.g., her job position within an enterprise.
The first RBAC model (RBAC96 [43]) defines (authorization)
policies by mapping each user to a set of roles and each role to
a set of permissions; a permission is defined as an abstraction of
a set of operations that can be performed on a set of objects, i.e.,
resources. Therefore, a user is allowed to perform only the opera-
tions of the permissions associated with her role. Several proposals
have extended RBAC96 to support new types of policies, such as
delegation [18, 46, 54, 56] and contextual [3, 9, 10, 28, 42]. In addi-
tion to extended RBAC models, several policy languages have been
proposed to ease the specification of complex RBAC policies on
top of these models. In this paper we consider our recent proposal
of an RBAC model, called GemRBAC+CTX [6, 8], which has been
designed to be very expressive, by seamlessly integrating the vari-
ous types of authorization policies surveyed in the literature and
classified in a taxonomy [6]. To the best of our knowledge, the Gem-
RBAC+CTX model is the only one supporting all the policies types
classified in [6] (prerequisite [2, 43], cardinality [1], precedence and
dependency [44], role hierarchy [43], separation of duty (SoD) [45],
binding of duty (BoD) [48], delegation and revocation [18, 54],
contextual [10, 28]) and their different facets. Moreover, GemR-
BAC+CTX is paired with a high-level policy specification language,
GemRBAC-DSL [7], to encourage its adoption among practition-
ers. We formalized the policies supported by GemRBAC+CTX as
OCL (Object Constraint Language [39]) constraints [6, 8], to enable
their operationalization. Following a model-driven approach, we
defined the semantics of GemRBAC-DSL by mapping the language
constructs to the OCL constraints presented in [6, 8].
A big gap between the definition of new, richer RBACmodels and
languages and their adoption in practice is the availability of an en-
forcement mechanism: the latter is a component that receives a user
access request (hereafter referred to as “AC request”) at run time
and makes an access decision (allow/deny) based on the policies
configured for a system. The lack of enforcement mechanisms for
more expressive RBAC models has favored the adoption on a large
scale [38] of the standard RBAC96 model, which is, however, the
least expressive model. For instance, one of our industrial partners—
developing communication solutions for manipulating sensitive
data in critical situations such as natural disasters or wars—needs to
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specify and enforce complex policies that involve the user’s context
(space and time), the history of operations performed by the user,
and role delegations. An example of such a policy, in the context of
asylum seekers assistance, is: an operator with the role “coordinator”
can register asylum seekers only if he is located within a 20 miles
radius from the base camp, from 8am to 7pm.
Such policies are not supported by RBAC96, but can be speci-
fied using GemRBAC+CTX (and expressed using GemRBAC-DSL).
However, they cannot be enforced because there is no enforcement
mechanism for checking the complex AC policies that are supported
by the GemRBAC+CTX model. Indeed, state-of-the-art enforcement
mechanisms (such as [27, 29, 31, 33–35, 41, 47, 54]) support AC
models which are much less expressive than GemRBAC+CTX.
In this paper, we aim to fill this gap, by proposing an automated
mechanism to enforce complex AC policies defined on top of the
GemRBAC+CTX model and expressed in the GemRBAC-DSL lan-
guage. We follow a model-driven engineering (MDE) [15] approach
for enforcement based on standardized technologies such as the Uni-
fied Modelling Language (UML) and Object Constraint Language
(OCL) [39]. More specifically, we reduce the problem of enforcing
RBAC policies to the evaluation of the corresponding OCL constraints
on an instance of the GemRBAC+CTX model. One advantage of such
an approach is that the translation of GemRBAC-DSL policies into
OCL constraints is already defined [7]: by adopting a model-driven
approach, we can leverage the existing operationalization through
OCL constraints of GemRBAC-DSL policies. Moreover, OCL con-
straint checking, given that OCL is a standard, is a consolidated
technology implemented in mature tools, such as the constraint/-
query evaluator included in Eclipse OCL [19].
Our model-driven enforcement approach not only enforces poli-
cies upon receiving a user request, but also provides a continuous
enforcement after making an access decision, by handling events
corresponding to changes in the RBAC configuration, to guarantee
that a new configuration still fulfills the AC policies. The relevant
access decisions are re-evaluated whenever a new change, from
an AC point of view, occurs at the system state level (e.g., a user
changes location, or a new user is authenticated). For instance,
whenever a user changes her location, our enforcement mechanism
checks whether her active roles should be deactivated (because of
her new location). This enforcement is known as usage control [40]
in the area of AC.
Although there have been a few proposals for model-driven
enforcement [27, 33, 47], they adopt an RBAC model much sim-
pler than GemRBAC+CTX (and thus can deal with a limited set
of AC policy types); moreover, they consider a subset of the AC
requests/events supported by our approach. Furthermore, defin-
ing algorithms to precisely decide when and how to enforce OCL
constraints corresponding to GemRBAC-DSL policies, as well as
defining and engineering an architecture to integrate the constraint
checker into a Web application, remain open questions that are
addressed in this paper.
We implemented our model-driven enforcement mechanism in a
prototype, calledMORRO. We integratedMORRO into a Web appli-
cation developed by our industrial partner; following the guidelines
of the XACML standard architecture [37], our implementation in-
cludes a policy enforcement point (PEP) and a policy decision point
(PDP). Although the proposed architecture has been designed based
on our partner specifications, it can be generalized and integrated
into other Web applications. We evaluated MORRO in terms of ap-
plicability and scalability. The evaluation results show thatMORRO
can be adopted without considerably impacting the overall perfor-
mance (in terms of response time) of a Web application and that
MORRO scales linearly with respect to the various parameters (e.g.,
the number of users and roles) characterizing an AC configuration.
Overall, the results confirm the feasibility of using a model-driven
approach to efficiently enforce complex RBAC policies.
To summarize, the main contributions of this paper are: 1) a
model-driven approach for enforcing access control policies de-
fined on top of the GemRBAC+CTX model, including algorithms
specifying when and how the policy constraints are enforced; 2) an
extensive empirical evaluation of our approach when integrated in
an industrial system, to assess its performance and scalability.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background
material. Section 3 illustrates our model-driven approach for enforc-
ing GemRBAC+CTX policies. Section 4 describes the integration
of the proposed approach into the architecture of an industrial
Web application. Section 5 presents the empirical evaluation results.
Section 6 reviews the state of the art. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND: THE GEMRBAC+CTX
MODEL
The GemRBAC+CTX model [6, 8] is an extension of the RBAC96
model [43] that has been designed after surveying the various types
of the authorization policies proposed in the literature. The rest
of this section gives an overview of the main entities of GemR-
BAC+CTX that are used in the subsequent sections.
The GemRBAC+CTX model, defined as a UML class diagram,
contains all the entities (User, Role, Session, Permission) of the
original RBAC model. These entities are modeled as UML classes.
A permission is represented as a set of operations that can be
performed on a set of objects. The relations among these RBAC
entities are modeled as UML associations. Each role is assigned to
a set of permissions and to a set of users. A role can be inherited
using a role hierarchy relation. The inheritance of role assignment
relationships can be defined using a role hierarchy policy; a user
(or a role) assigned to a role (respectively permission) must also be
assigned to all its sub-roles (respectively sub-permissions) [43].
A session is a mapping of one user to a subset of the roles that
have been assigned to her; this mapping activates the role(s) for
a certain user. However, in some systems only a subset of the as-
signed roles can be activated (e.g., because of the user’s location),
which are called enabled. Once a role is enabled, a user can request
its activation within a session. Both role enabling and activation
are modeled as UML associations between the Role and Session
classes. Similarly, a permission is enabled if the user is allowed to
perform its associated operations.
In addition to assignment relations, authorization policies are
defined to restrict a user access. For instance, role and permission
enabling/disabling can be regulated through precedence and con-
textual policies. Precedence policies define a precedence relationship
between the enabling of a role and the activation of another role; for
example, role student is enabled only if a supervisor role has been
already activated. Contextual policies restrict a user to activate a
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role or perform an operation assigned to a permission of her role de-
pending on her location [10] (location-based policy) and the current
time [28] (time-based policy). The context (i.e., spatial and temporal
information) is modeled with class RBACContext, which contains a
TimeExpression and/or a Location. The GemRBAC+CTX model
supports policies with fine-grained temporal and spatial expres-
sions, such as “the first Monday of each month, from April 9, 2018
to January 11, 2019” and “the first floor of building A”. A role is
disabled if its corresponding contextual or a precedence policy is
violated; a permission is disabled if its corresponding contextual
policy is violated.
The GemRBAC+CTX model supports other types of authoriza-
tion policies. Prerequisite policies define a precondition on user-to-
role assignment, allowing a user to acquire a role only if she is
already assigned to another one [2, 43]. Prerequisite policies can
also be defined at the permission level, allowing a role to acquire
a permission only if this role is already assigned to another per-
mission. Cardinality policies define a bound on the cardinality of
role activation and assignment relations [1]; e.g., a policy of type
cardinality on role activation restricts a user from activating a num-
ber of roles that exceeds a given threshold. Dependency policies,
complementary to the precedence ones, restrict the deactivation of
a role if another role is still active [44]. Separation of duty policies
(SoD) define a mutual exclusion relation among roles, permissions,
or users; the entities involved in such relations are called conflicting;
SoD policies can be either static or dynamic. Static SoD policies deal
with user-to-role and role-to-permission assignments; for example,
static SoD on conflicting roles specifies that the same user cannot
be assigned to mutually exclusive roles. Dynamic SoD policies deal
with user-role activation through a session; in this case, a user is
allowed to acquire conflicting roles but she cannot activate them
at the same time. Examples of this type of policy are dynamic SoD
on conflicting roles (DCR) or users (DCU) and history-based (His)
DSoD [6, 45]. Binding of Duty (BoD) policies are the dual of the
SoD ones and define a correlation between a set of permissions,
which are called bounded; they are usually used in the context of
workflow systems, whose activities can be performed by different
users with different roles. For example, in role-based BoD, the op-
erations allowed by two or more permissions have to be performed
by the same role [48]. To support history-based policies such as
dynamic SoD or BoD, operations performed by a user on a given
object in a certain context, are recorded and modeled as instances
of class History. Delegation policies allow a user to delegate or
transfer her role to another user [18, 54]. A delegation is partial
if only a strict subset of the permissions associated to a role has
been delegated; total otherwise. Revocation policies allow a user to
revoke a delegated role [54].
An instance of the GemRBAC+CTXmodel corresponds to a snap-
shot of the system state from an RBAC point of view, at a given
time point. For example, the object diagram in figure 1 depicts
an instance of the GemRBAC+CTX model that represents the fol-
lowing RBAC entities: two Users, u1 and u2; two Roles r1 and r2;
two Permissions, p1 and p2; two Operations op1 and op2; four
Objects, o1, o2, o3 and o4. Permission p1 is assigned to role r1 and
permission p2 is assigned to role r2 through role-permission assign-
ment associations (RPA). Permission p1 maps operations op1 and
op2 to objects o1 and o2; similarly, permission p2 maps operation
s1: Session
u1: User
r1: Role p2: Permission
u2: User
p1: Permission op1: Operation
op2: Operationo1: Object
o3: Object
o2: Object
o4: Object
r2: Role
Legend
RA: role activation
URA: user-role assignment
RPA: role-permission assignment
RA
RA
RPA
URA URAURA
URA
RPA
cU1: 
RBACContext
pU1: 
Location
Figure 1: An instance of the GemRBAC+CTX model repre-
senting a system state.
op1 to objects o3 and o4. Moreover, both roles r1 and r2 are assigned
both to user u1 and to user u2 through user-role assignment associ-
ations (URA). At the time when the snapshot has been taken, only
user u1 is connected through her session s1 and has activated her
assigned roles (r1 and r2) as shown by the role-activation associa-
tions (RA). The location of user u1 is modeled with object cU1, an
instance of the RBACContext class with a Location object pU1.
The policies supported by the GemRBAC+CTX model have been
formalized as OCL constraints [6, 8], to enable their operationaliza-
tion. For instance, a Dynamic Separation of duty policy (DSoD) on
conflicting roles, such as “a user can activate either role r1 or r2”,
is checked by verifying the following invariant (taken from [6]) of
the class Session, defined as an OCL constraint: Session, defined
as an OCL constraint:
1 context Session inv DSoD:
2 let r1:Role = Role.allInstances ()
3 -> select(r:Role | r.idRole='r1'),
4 r2:Role = Role.allInstances ()
5 -> select(r:Role | r.idRole='r2')
6 in if self.activeRoles -> includes(r2)
7 or self.activeRoles -> includes(r1) then
8 self.activeRoles -> includes(r2)
9 xor self.activeRoles -> includes(r1)
10 endif
The DSoD policy above can be checked on the model instance
shown in figure 1 by evaluating the invariant DSoD on the Session
object s1. In this case, the condition at lines 6–7 is true because
both roles r1 and r2 are active. Therefore, we follow the then branch
and evaluate the boolean expression at lines 8–9. This expression
states that the list of active roles associated with session s1 should
contain either r1 or r2, but not both. Since both roles are active, the
expression evaluates to false, meaning that the policy is violated.
The OCL formalization of the RBAC policies has been used to
define the semantics of GemRBAC-DSL [7], a high-level policy
specification language built on top of GemRBAC+CTX. Each policy
expressed in GemRBAC-DSL is mapped to an OCL constraint to
operationalize its checking. For instance, the DSoD policy above
can be expressed in GemRBAC-DSL as:
PL1-DSoD: conflicting-roles-activation r1, r2;
We remark that GemRBAC-DSL does not express basic AC policies,
i.e., those encoded as a) role-to-user and role-to-permission assign-
ments, and as b) role-to-session activation or enabling relations;
GemRBAC-DSL assumes that such policies are already defined at
the model level as UML associations.
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Figure 2: Overview of the proposed model-driven frame-
work for policy enforcement.
3 MODEL-DRIVEN ENFORCEMENT OF
COMPLEX POLICIES
The goal of this paper is to propose an automated mechanism to en-
force access control policies defined on top of the GemRBAC+CTX
model and expressed using the GemRBAC-DSL language. One ba-
sic idea to achieve this goal is to leverage the operationalization
throughOCL constraints of GemRBAC-DSL policies proposed in [7],
to define a model-driven enforcement approach. At the base of this
approach there is the reduction of the problem of enforcingGemRBAC-
DSL policies to the evaluation of the corresponding OCL constraints
on an instance of GemRBAC+CTX (which captures the system state
from an AC point of view). Adopting a model-driven approach for
enforcing GemRBAC-DSL policies has two main advantages: 1) the
possibility of building upon the existing translation of GemRBAC-
DSL policies into OCL constraints, which is already optimized for
efficient checking; 2) the reliance on OCL, which is a standard and
for which there exists mature constraint checking technology.
Nevertheless, putting such an approach in operation, requires
to define algorithms to precisely decide when and how to enforce
such constraints, as well as to outline an architecture that describes
how to integrate the constraint checker into a Web application
architecture: these are open questions that will be addressed by the
coming sections.
Figure 2 illustrates how our approach can be realized in an en-
forcement framework. Before deploying the application, we assume
that a security admin has defined the initial system state from the
point of view of AC. This means that the main RBAC entities (i.e.,
users, roles, permissions, operations and objects) of the system
have been defined, together with their assignment relations (e.g.,
assignment of permissions to the various roles). These entities,
representing the static RBAC view of the system, are captured in
an instance of the GemRBAC+CTX model called initialSnap. We
also assume that the security admin has defined the AC policies
in GemRBAC-DSL. These policies are then translated into a set of
OCL constraints (with respect to the GemRBAC+CTX model) using
the translation defined in [7].
After deployment, when the system is executing, the enforce-
ment framework works as follows. Its inputs are:
• The set of OCL constraints corresponding to the GemRBAC-
DSL policies defined for the system.
• A snapshot Snap of the system state from the point of view
of AC, represented as a GemRBAC+CTX instance. This snapshot
Table 1: Policies checked for each type of AC request/event
R
P Prq RH AC AS Prec Dep S DCR DCU Obj Op His BoD CT CL Deleg Rev
RA ✓ ✓ ✓
AR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RD ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
AO ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
UA ✓ ✓ ✓
ULC ✓
UD ✓
Legend. R: AC request/event. P: policy. Type of AC request/event: RA: role activation; AR: access
to a resource; RD: role delegation, RR: role revocation; AO: administrative operation; UA: user
authentication; ULC: user’s location change; UD: user disconnection. Type of policy: Prq: prereq-
uisite; RH: role hierarchy; AC: cardinality on role activation; AS: cardinality on assignment rela-
tions; Prec: precedence; Dep: dependency; S: static SoD; DCR: dynamic SoD on conflicting roles;
DCU: dynamic SoD on conflicting users; Obj: object-based DSoD; Op: operational-based DSoD,
His: history-based DSoD; BoD: binding of duty; CT: time-based context; CL: location-based con-
text; Deleg: delegation; Rev: revocation.
captures both the static RBAC view of the system and the dynamic
RBAC view (e.g., active sessions, users’ contexts); it is updated at
run time as the AC configuration evolves. Notice that right after
the start of the system execution, Snap corresponds to initialSnap.
• The actual AC request that has to be enforced. It contains
(as instances of the corresponding classes of the GemRBAC+CTX
model) the Object to access and the Operation to perform on it,
such as “GET /url/to/resource”.
The various steps of the enforcement process are shown in fig-
ure 2 and are marked with green dashed lines and circles. The main
component of the enforcement framework is the SnapProcessor.
Once the framework receives an AC request (step 1 ), the SnapPro-
cessor first analyzes the request by checking whether the request
is valid (step 2 ). For instance, a user cannot request to activate a
role that is not assigned to her. In case the request is not valid, the
access is denied and the access decision is returned (step 5 ).
Otherwise, if the request is valid, the SnapProcessor builds a new
snapshot of the system state (step 3.a ), starting from the current
state captured by the Snap. This new snapshot, called TargetSnap
and also represented as an instance of the GemRBAC+CTX model,
captures the next system state (from the point of view of AC) as
if the AC request had been allowed. After creating the TargetSnap,
the SnapProcessor selects—based on the type and the parameters of
the AC request—the OCL constraints to evaluate (step 3.b ), corre-
sponding to the policies to enforce; the policies selection follows
the rules encoded in the top part of table 1. The selected OCL con-
straints are evaluated by an OCL checker (step 4 ). In this way,
making an access decision for an AC request (step 5 ) is equivalent
to verifying whether the TargetSnap satisfies the OCL constraints
corresponding to the policies to enforce. If the constraints evaluate
to true, it means that the AC request can be allowed, since it will not
violate any policy. On the contrary, when the constraints evaluate
to false, it means that allowing the request would violate one or
more of the policies defined for the system.
Our approach adopts also the usage control [40] concept for AC,
which aims to revise AC decisions (by re-enforcing AC policies)
when a new update, from the point of view of AC, occurs at the
system level. For instance, whenever a user changes her location,
our enforcement mechanism re-evaluates the (OCL constraints cor-
responding to the) location-based policies for this user, to check
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Algorithm 1 Enforcement upon
receiving an AC request
Input: a = AC request,
Snap = current system state,
P = list of system policies
Output: a tuple ⟨d , TargetSnap⟩, where:
d = access decision,
TargetSnap = new system state
1: PLC ← ∅, TargetSnap ← null, d ← null
2: if validateRequest(a) then
3: TargetSnap ← buildTargetSnap(a, Snap)
4: PLC ← selectPolicies(P , a)
5: else d ← false
6: if d is null thend ← check(TargetSnap, PLC)
7: return ⟨d , TargetSnap⟩
Algorithm 2 Enforcement
after an AC event occurs
Input: e = AC event,
Snap = current system state,
P = list of system policies
Output: USnap = updated system state
1: PLC ← ∅, USnap ← null
2: USnap ← updateState(e , Snap)
3: PLC ← selectPolicies(P , e )
4: for each policy p in PLC do
5: check(USnap, p)
6: if p is not satisfied then
rectify(USnap, p , e )
7: return USnap
whether the new system state satisfies them. The various steps of
the enforcement process upon an AC event are shown in figure 2
and are marked with blue solid lines and squared boxes. In our
case, we assume that the enforcement framework will receive, from
an external component, a notification when an AC event occurs
(step 1 ). Reacting to this notification, the SnapProcessor creates
the TargetSnap, obtained by updating (according to the received
event) the current system state captured by the Snap (step 2.a ).
The SnapProcessor then selects—based on the type of the AC event—
the OCL constraints to evaluate (step 2.b ), corresponding to the
policies to enforce; the policies selection follows the rules encoded
in the bottom part of table 1. Finally, it checks, by means of the OCL
checker, whether the selected policies are still satisfied (step 3 ).
If a policy violation is detected, the SnapProcessor updates the Tar-
getSnap by disabling/deactivating the corresponding role (step 4 );
the updated TargetSnap then becomes the new Snap (step 5 ).
The next subsections explain how our framework enforces AC
policies when making an access decision for an AC request (sec-
tion 3.1) and when handling notifications for AC events (section 3.2).
3.1 Making Access Decisions for AC Requests
The procedure for enforcing policies upon receiving an AC request
is shown in algorithm 1. It takes as input an AC requesta, a snapshot
Snap corresponding to the system state (from the point of view of
AC) at the time of the request, and the list P of policies defined
for the system; it returns a tuple, containing the access decision d
(a boolean value, with true corresponding to “allow” and false to
“deny”) and a snapshot TargetSnap (an instance of GemRBAC+CTX
corresponding to the new system state as if the request had been
authorized). Besides variables d and TargetSnap, the procedure uses
an auxiliary variable PLC, representing the list of policies to check
for a specific type of the AC request and initialized to an empty
list. Both variables TargetSnap and d are initialized to null. Our
approach considers AC requests of type: role activation, access to a
resource, role delegation, role revocation, and administrative operation
(i.e., assigning a role to a user or to a permission).
First, the SnapProcessor checks the validity of the request by call-
ing operation validateRequest (line 2, corresponding to step 2
in figure 2). The validity is determined based on the type of the
AC request as follows. In case of a role activation, the request is
valid if the role to activate is already enabled for the user who
made the request. In case of an access to a resource, the requested
permission (e.g., p) should be assigned to an active role r in the
current session of the user who made the request and should be
enabled; if the user who made the request acquired role r through
a delegation, this delegation should include permission p. In case
of a role delegation, the role being delegated should be assigned to
the user who made the request and not assigned to the user who
will receive the delegation. In case of an administrative operation,
the requested user (respectively, permission) should not belong
to the list of users (respectively, permissions) assigned to the role
indicated in the request.
If the AC request a is not valid, the SnapProcessor sets the access
decision d to false (line 5). Otherwise, the SnapProcessor builds the
TargetSnap by calling operation buildTargetSnap (line 3, corre-
sponding to step 3.a in figure 2). This operation takes as input the
AC request a and the snapshot Snap; its behavior depends on the
type of the AC request:
• Role activation. We consider a request of the form “user u1
requesting to activate role r1”. First, we remove role r1 from the list
of enabled roles. Then, we add it to the list of active roles for user
u1; if a precedence policy is specified for role r1, the SnapProcessor
enables the list of roles which should be enabled for other users,
according to the precedence relation.
• Access to a resource. We consider a request of the form user
“u1 with role r1 requesting to perform operation op1 on object o1”.
To build TargetSnap, we add a new instance of type History to the
current Snap. This instance records that user u1, while having role
r1, performed operation op1 on object o1 through permission p1.
• Role delegation. We consider a request of the form “user u1
requesting to delegate her role r1 to user u2”. The TargetSnap is
obtained by adding role r1 to the list of delegated roles for user u2
and creating a new instance of class Delegation.
• Role revocation. We consider a request of the form “user u1
requesting to revoke delegation d1”; we also assume that user u2
acquired role r2 through delegation d1 (originated from u1). We
build the TargetSnap by removing role r2 from the list of delegated
roles assigned to user u2, marking delegation d1 as revoked, and
recording the revoking user (u1).
• Administrative operation. We consider a request of the form
“admin requesting to assign role r1 to useru1” or “‘admin requesting
to assign role r1 to permission p1”. The SnapProcessor builds the
TargetSnap by adding the appropriate assignment relation, i.e a role-
to-user assignment or a role-to-permission assignment relation.
After building the TargetSnap, the SnapProcessor extracts the list
PLC of policies to check from the system policies list P by calling
operation selectPolicies (line 4, corresponding to step 3.b in
figure 2). This operation determines the list of policies to check
based on the type (i.e., according to table 1) and the parameters
of the request. For instance, in case of an AC request of type role
activation, the list PLC will contain all the policies in P whose type
is indicated in row RA (i.e., AC, DCR, DCU), and whose parameters
match at least one of the request parameters (i.e., the user who
made the request and the role to activate).
Then, if the access decision d has not been set yet (i.e., it is null),
the algorithm invokes the OCL checker (operation check at line 6,
corresponding to step 4 in figure 2). This operation evaluates, on
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the TargetSnap, the OCL constraints corresponding to the policies
in PLC; the result of the evaluation will contain the access decision.
The algorithm ends by returning the tuple with both the access
decisiond and the new system state TargetSnap (step 5 in figure 2).
We recall that when the access is denied TargetSnap will be null.
3.2 Handling Notifications for AC Events
The procedure for updating the system state captured by the Snap
and enforcing policies upon receiving a notification for an AC event
is shown in algorithm 2. It takes as input an AC event e , a snapshot
Snap corresponding to the system state (from the point of view of
AC) at the time of the notification, and the list of policies P defined
for the system; it returns a snapshot USnap, which is an instance of
the GemRBAC+CTX model corresponding to the updated system
state. Besides variable USnap (initialized to null), the procedure
uses an auxiliary variable PLC, representing the list of policies to
check for a specific type of event and initialized to an empty list.
Our approach considers events of type user authentication, user’s
location change, and user disconnection.
Upon receiving an event notification, the SnapProcessor first up-
dates the system state according to the received event by calling
operation updateState (line 2, corresponding to step 2.a in fig-
ure 2). This operation takes as input the received AC event e and the
current system state captured by the Snap; it returns the updated
state in USnap. The behavior of operation update depends on the
type of the event e:
• The user authentication event corresponds to the case of a
user logging in the system. We assume that the enforcement frame-
work receives the notification from an authentication server, which
checks the user credentials and allows her login. In this case, we
update the state by adding a new instance of class Session for
the authenticated user, updating the user’s location, and enabling,
within the newly added session, all the roles assigned to the user.
• The user’s location change event corresponds to the case of
a connected user changing her location. We assume that a geo-
localization server keeps track of the user position; this server sends
a notification to the enforcement framework whenever a connected
user changes her location. In this case, the state is updated by
updating the user’s location.
• The user disconnection event corresponds to the case when a
user is experiencing network issues. We assume that the authen-
tication server periodically checks for the online status of a user
and sends a notification to the enforcement framework when it
detects that the user is offline1. In this case, we update the state by
removing the session of the disconnected user.
Afterwards, the SnapProcessor extracts the list PLC of policies to
check from the system policies list P , by calling operation select-
Policies (line 3, corresponding to step 2.b in figure 2). This
operation determines the list of policies to check based on the type
(according to table 1) and the parameters of the received event
notification. For instance, in case of a user authentication event, the
list PLC will contain all the policies in P whose type is indicated
in row UA (i.e., CT, CL), and whose parameters match at least
1The case of a user sending a log out request to the authentication server is treated by
forwarding the request to the enforcement mechanism, which is then processed as
explained in section 3.1.
one of the notification parameters. Then, for each policy p in PLC,
the SnapProcessor invokes the OCL checker (operation check at
line 5, corresponding to step 3 in figure 2), to evaluate, on the
USnap, the OCL constraint(s) corresponding to p. If the result of the
evaluation is false, it means that the new system state (as determined
in response to the event e) violates policy p. Applying the usage
control concept, the SnapProcessor amends the USnap, by calling
operation rectify (line 6, corresponding to step 4 in figure 2);
the behavior of this operation depends on the type of the event e:
• User authentication. We consider a notification of the form
{u1, s1, loc}, whereu1 is the user being authenticated, s1 is the token
representing the user’s session, loc is the current position of the user.
For each role r enabled for user u1 in session s1, the SnapProcessor
amends USnap by disabling role r in session s1.
• User’s location change. We consider a notification of the form
{u1, loc1, loc2}, where u1 denotes the user and loc1 and loc2 corre-
spond, respectively, to the previous and the new position of user
u1. For each role r assigned to user u1, the SnapProcessor amends
USnap according to the state of role r : if it is enabled (respectively,
active), the SnapProcessor will disable (respectively, deactivate) it
from all the sessions of user u1.
• User disconnection. We consider a notification of the form
{u1, s1}, whereu1 is the user being authenticated and s1 is the token
representing the user’s session. For each role r assigned to user u1,
the SnapProcessor amends USnap by disabling and deactivating role
r1 from all sessions in the system.
The algorithm ends by returning USnap (step 5 in figure 2).
4 RUN-TIME ARCHITECTURE AND
IMPLEMENTATION
We have integrated the enforcement framework presented in sec-
tion 3 into the architecture of a Web application developed by our
partner. This architecture includes: a) a Web application and a set
of micro-services, which expose resources accessible through the
web interface; b) a geo-localization server, which records the users’
position; and c) an authentication server, for authenticating users
based on their credentials.
To integrate our enforcement framework, we have added two
new components to this architecture: an authorization server and
a proxy. These components follows the guidelines of the XACML
standard architecture [37], which prescribes to use two components:
a policy enforcement point (PEP) and a policy decision point (PDP). In
this standard architecture, a user AC request is intercepted by the
PEP, which will transform it into an XACML request and forward it
to the PDP; the latter evaluates the request based on the authoriza-
tion policies. In our case, the PEP is the proxy, while the PDP is the
authorization server. The authorization server integrates the Snap-
Processor and the OCL Checker shown in figure 2; it receives AC
requests and notification of AC events and enforces the policies as
described in section 3, making sure that only authorized users can
access the resources exposed by the set of micro-services. The proxy
is a gateway that intercepts user AC requests: it first forwards them
to the authorization server, which makes an access decision that is
returned to the proxy; if the access decision is “allow” the proxy for-
wards the original user request to the corresponding micro-service.
In addition, we have included a storage component for the access
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control data, which contains the snapshot Snap (given in input to
and updated by the authorization server) and the GemRBAC+CTX
policies to enforce.
Although the resulting enforcement architecture has been de-
signed based on the architectural specifications provided by our
industrial partner, it can be generalized and integrated into other
Web applications. More specifically, the proxy can be integrated
seamlessly within existing load balancers, which are very common
in Web applications [16]; the authorization server and the storage
are additional components that can be deployed on any Web appli-
cation server.
Implementation. The core of our framework is a component,
called MORRO (MOdel-driven fRamework for Run-time enforce-
ment of RBAC pOlicies), and includes the authorization server and
the proxy. MORRO has been implemented in Java with a micro-
service based architecture using the SpringBoot [49] framework and
the ZuuL proxy v.1.2.7 [36]. The implementation of the authoriza-
tion server uses the Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF) and Eclipse
OCL v.5.2 [19]. The Snap is expressed as an Ecore [20] model.
5 EVALUATION
In this section we report on the evaluation of MORRO when de-
ployed in a real Web application, with a complex AC configuration.
We assess the efficiency and applicability of MORRO by answering
the following research questions:
RQ1: How long does the authorization server in MORRO take to
process AC requests/events, when deployed on a real industrial system,
under various AC configurations?
RQ2: How do the access decision time and the AC event process-
ing time of the authorization server in MORRO scale with respect to
changes of the various parameters potentially affecting the perfor-
mance of an AC configuration?
RQ3: What is the communication overhead between the autho-
rization server and the proxy in case of an AC request?
5.1 Evaluation Settings
We considered a real AC configuration used by our industrial part-
ner, consisting of 1648 users, 396 roles, 53 permissions, 300 objects
and 4 operations (create, read, update, and delete). We defined a
set of GemRBAC-DSL policies in collaboration with the security
engineers of our partner. We then determined the types of policies
used in the specification and, for each type, we considered a rep-
resentative example to answer the research questions mentioned
above. To enableMORRO to enforce them, we used the mapping of
these policies to OCL constraints we previously proposed in [6, 8].
We deployedMORRO onto a micro-service-based architecture
provided by our industrial partner. This architecture was running
on a development machine equipped with a dual CPU Intel Xeon
E5-2640 v2 2GHz and 24GB of memory; we used this machine to
run all the experiments. All time measurement were performed
by invoking the System.nanoTime() method of the standard Java
library, version 1.8.
Due to space reasons, in the following we present only a sum-
mary of the evaluation results. We refer to the first author’s PhD
thesis [5, chapter III] for a complete description of the policies used
in the evaluation and for the detailed experimental results.
5.2 Performance on an Industrial System
Methodology. To address RQ1, we measured the time taken by
the authorization server in MORRO to process different types of
AC requests and events. More specifically, in case of an AC request
we measured the access decision time, i.e., the time difference from
the time the authorization server receives the request to the time it
yields an access decision. In case of an AC event, we measured the
execution time needed to update the current system state (Snap),
i.e., the time difference from the time the authorization server re-
ceives a notification for an AC event until the time it updates the
current system state. Based on the AC configuration of the test
application defined by our industrial partner, we generated two
types of AC requests and two types of AC events. For each type of
request (respectively, event) the access decision time (respectively,
execution time) was assessed both on a basic configuration—i.e., an
AC configuration that is only determined by role assignment and
activation relations—and on configurations that add to the basic
configuration other policies to be checked. The types of requests
and events generated are:
• Access to a resource. We consider two scenarios: 1) when the
role of the user making the request has been assigned and 2) when
a subset of the permissions assigned to this role has been delegated.
As for the configurations, in addition to the basic one, we use one
with a history-based DSoD policy and another with a BoD policy.
• Role activation. The additional configurations use the cardi-
nality on role activation and the DCR policies.
• User authentication. We consider two scenarios, in which we
distinguish whether the user’s position is known or not. The ad-
ditional configurations use precedence, location-based, and time-
based policies.
• User’s location change. We consider one additional configura-
tion with a location-based policy.
For all configurations we considered the worst-case scenario, with
the maximum allowed value for each system parameter (e.g., maxi-
mum number of roles assigned to a user).
SinceMORRO runs on a Java-based environment, the measure-
ments of the running time are affected by various factors [23]. Fur-
thermore, the network-based communication between the proxy
and the authorization server introduces some noise. For these rea-
sons, when measuring the access decision time for AC requests,
we sent ten AC requests, discarded the first one (since it is affected
by the loading time of the run-time libraries), and measured the
average value over checking the nine subsequent requests. As for
measuring the execution time for processing AC events, we were
able to achieve stable results by sending only five notifications. As
above, since the first value is affected by the loading of the run-
time libraries, we discarded it and measured the average value over
processing the four subsequent notifications. In both cases, to keep
the same instance over the different runs, we designed the (initial)
AC configuration of the system such that the OCL checker yields
false (denying the access request).
Results.We answer RQ1 by summarizing the main results. The
access decision time within the authorization server is less than
64ms; the highest value is obtained while evaluating an AC request
of type access to a resource for a configuration with a history-based
DSoD policy in a role delegation scenario. This value has to be
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analyzed in the context of Web applications which are accessed by
users from a browser. In modern Web applications, the complexity
of each single Web page requires a relatively high network time (i.e.,
the time needed by a browser to fetch all resources to be displayed
on a page); for example, a web page from Wikipedia requires on
average 1880ms of networking time [17]. Under this scenario, a
maximum overhead of 64ms due to the AC enforcement framework
would correspond to less than 4% increase over the total networking
time, which is quite affordable in practice.
The execution time for processing a notification of an AC event is
less than 512ms; the highest value is obtained while evaluating an
AC request of type user authentication for a configuration with a
precedence policy considering the case when the user position is
known. This value has also to be interpreted in the context of Web
applications. In such a context, an AC event is triggered by a user
action and its processing should be completed before the next user
request, so that the latter can be evaluated on the updated system
data (as modified by the AC event). Hence, the execution time for
processing the notification of an AC event should be less than the
time between the completion of a user request and the start of a
new one (i.e., the think time). TCP-W [51], a common benchmark
for Web applications, considers an average think time of 7 s; the
maximum value for the execution time in our system (512ms) is
well below this threshold.
5.3 Scalability
Methodology. To answer RQ2, we evaluated the scalability of the
authorization server. Scalability is concerned with analyzing the
change in access decision time (and AC event execution time) as
parameters increase in value, with respect to different scenarios and
configurations. Our goal is to use such information to draw con-
clusions on how our solution is likely to tackle even more complex
AC situations.
We considered the same AC requests and AC events used to
answer RQ1, and the corresponding scenarios and configurations.
To assess the effect of a parameter, we varied it while keeping
all the other relevant system parameters constant. The parameter
varied either between a range of values with a certain step incre-
ment, or through a set of predefined values; the latter case occurred
for parameters that affect the evaluation of spatial and temporal
policies. The snapshots of the system state corresponding to all
these configurations were generated using an internally developed,
parametrized generator. In each experimental run, we sent an AC
request or an AC event notification. In the case of AC requests, we
measured the access decision time; in the case of AC events, we
measured the execution time for processing the event. In both cases,
we measured these values following the same procedure described
in the answer to RQ1.
Results. For space reasons, here we only present the results
corresponding to one type of AC request and to one type of AC
event, on a specific configuration.
Table 2 reports the evaluation results for an AC request of type
access to a resource (AR) and for an AC event of type user authenti-
cation (UA). We consider 1) an AC request of the form “u1 with role
r1 in session s1 requesting to perform operation op1 on object o1”,
on a configuration with a history-based DSoD policy (His), for both
Table 2: Scalability of MORRO under various system config-
urations.
AC
Conf
Param Values Range StepInc
Time (ms)
lower upper min max Data trend
AR-His
-RLA
b 1K 10K 1K 73 99 alc M: 84.30, SD: 8.53
d 1K 10K 1K 37 49 linear
e 1K 4K 1K 56 74 alc M: 65.64, SD: 7.33
f 1K 10K 1K 39 85 linear
AR-His
-RLD
b 1K 10K 1K 96 108 alc M: 100.75, SD: 4.05
d 1K 10K 1K 58 115 linear
e 1K 4K 1K 123 148 alc M:138.02, SD:10.63
f 1K 10K 1K 61 123 linear
UA-Prec
-UL
g 1K 10K 1K 199 339 linear
c 1K 5K 1K 845 1444 linear
a 10K 25K 5K 891 1607 linear
UA-Prec
-KL
g 1K 10K 1K 233 452 linear
c 1K 5K 1K 1497 1628 linear
a 10K 25K 5K 901 2017 linear
Parameters labels. a: #sessions in the system; b: #active roles in s1 (current session
of the user who made the request); c: #active roles in all sessions. d: #logs associated
with conflicting roles; e: #objects within the set of logs; f: #operations in the system;
g: #roles assigned to user u1.
Configuration scenarios labels. RLA: role assignment scenario; RLD: role delegation
scenario; UL: the user location is unknown; KL: the user location is known.
scenarios of role assignment (RLA) and role delegation (RLD); and
2) an AC event of type user authentication (UA), with a notification
of the form {u1, s1, loc}—where u1 is the user being authenticated,
s1 is the token representing the user’s session, loc is the current
position of the user—on a configuration with a precedence policy
(Prec), for two scenarios, in which we distinguish whether the user’s
position is known (KL) or not (UL). Column AC Conf indicates for
each request/event the considered configuration and scenario. For
instance, the configuration on the first row (AR-His-RLA) corre-
sponds to the case of an AC request of type access to a resource on
a configuration with a “His” policy while considering a role assign-
ment scenario. Column Param indicates (with a label, see legend
at the bottom of the table) the parameter being assessed during
the run; column Values Range denotes the lower and upper bounds
of the range of values through which the parameter is varied; the
step increment is shown in column Step Inc; column Time indicates
the access decision time; columns min and max denote the lowest
and the highest time values observed across runs; column Data
trend indicates the trend observed for the data points: in case of an
“almost constant” (referred to as alc) trend, we include the average
(column M) and the standard deviation (SD).
The answer to RQ2 is that the access decision time and the exe-
cution time for processing a notification of an AC event are either
linear with respect to the parameters of the various configurations
or almost constant (i.e., there is no much variation across runs, with
low SD). These trends can be explained in terms of the operations
called in the OCL constraints (see [6, 8]) evaluated for each policy.
For example, for the first configuration (“AC-His-RLA”) with param-
eter “b” (the number of active roles in session s1), the access decision
time is almost constant, i.e., it does not depend on parameter “b”: this
is due to the definition (in [6]) of the OCL constraint corresponding
to the history-based DSoD policy), in which checking whether both
conflicting roles are active in session s1 is performed in a constant
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time. Similar trends can be observed for the other configurations,
for each type of AC request/event. Overall, these results imply that
our solution is applicable for even more challenging AC situations
with larger numbers of sessions, roles, and permissions.
The highest value for the access decision time we measured
was 148ms, in the case of a request of type access to a resource, in a
configuration with aHis policy, with a role delegation scenario, with
10K objects within the set of logs. Along the lines of the discussion
for RQ1, such value would represent an 8% overhead with respect
to the average networking time (see [17]) for fetching a complex
Web page. Such an overhead is still acceptable when enforcing AC
policies in large systems.
The highest value for the execution time we measured was
2017ms, in the case of an AC event of type user authentication,
in a configuration with a precedence policy, with 25K active ses-
sions, with a known user location. As also discussed for RQ1, this
value would still be below the think time threshold (7 s) provided
by the TCP-W [51] benchmark.
5.4 Overhead of the Communication between
the Authorization Service and the Proxy
Methodology. To address RQ3, we measured the communication
overhead between the authorization service and the proxy, i.e., the
time taken to dispatch an authorization request from the proxy to
the authorization server, plus the time to propagate the access deci-
sion from the authorization server back to the proxy. We computed
this overhead as the difference between the access decision time
measured within the proxy and the access decision time measured
within the authorization server; the access decision time within
the proxy is the difference between the time instant at which the
proxy receives an AC request from the user and the time instant at
which the proxy receives an access decision for that request from
the authorization server.
Wemeasured this difference for all the requests/events, scenarios
and configurations mentioned in section 5.2.
Results. The answer to RQ3 is that the overall overhead of the
communication between the authorization service and the proxy is
less than 60ms. When considering both the access decision time
within the authorization server and the communication overhead
between the authorization server and the proxy, the most taxing
AC request is one of type access to a resource, for a configuration
with a “His” policy, with an access decision time within the proxy of
107ms. Along the lines of the discussion for RQ1, such value would
represent less than 6% of the average networking time (see [17]) for
fetching a complex Web page. Furthermore, this value is far below
the threshold (200ms) indicated in the requirements specifications
of the Web application developed by our industrial partner.
6 RELATEDWORK
This work leverages our previous work on modeling and specifying
complex RBAC policies using the GemRBAC+CTX model [6, 8]
and the GemRBAC-DSL language [7], including the operationaliza-
tion of RBAC policies as OCL constraints. This paper complements
and advances our previous work by providing an approach for the
enforcement of RBAC policies, which includes the description of
algorithms specifying when and how the policy constraints are en-
Table 3: Support of AC requests/events in existing policy en-
forcement approaches (abbreviations are defined in Table 1)
AC Request AC Event
RA AR RD RR AO UA ULC UD
Sohr et al. [47] + + - - + + - -
Hummer et al. [27] - + - - - - - -
Martinez et al. [33] + + - - - - - -
Zhang et al. [54] - - + + - - - -
Margheri et al. [31] - + - - - - - -
Mourad et al. [34] - + - - - - - -
Kallel et al. [29] + + - - + - + -
Mariscal et al. [41] - + - - - - - -
Mustafa et al. [35] + + - - + - + -
Kirkpatrick et al. [30] - + - - - + - -
Bhatti et al. [12] + + - - + - + -
Ben David et al. [4] + + - - - + - +
MORRO (this work) + + + + + + + +
forced, the definition and engineering of an architecture to integrate
the constraint checker into a Web application, and an empirical
evaluation of the performance and scalability of the approach when
integrated into an industrial system.
A work very close to our contribution has been proposed by
Sohr et al. [47], which implements the PDP as a model-driven au-
thorization engine, in the context of Web services. RBAC policies
are expressed as OCL contraints using the USE tool, a validation
tool for UML models and OCL constraints. Similar toMORRO, to
make an access decision, the authorization engine checks whether
the system state, represented as an UML object diagram, satisfies
the RBAC policies expressed as OCL constraints. The main differ-
ence is that this work is based on the standard RBAC96 model,
which supports a limited subset of the policies that can be spec-
ified in GemRBAC+CTX (and enforced by our approach). More
precisely, the proposed enforcement mechanism supports only car-
dinality, prerequisite, and history-based SoD. Moreover, contextual
policies assume that the context is represented symbolically: i.e.,
fine-grained spatial (e.g., with relative locations) and temporal (e.g.,
with intervals) policies are not supported. Because of these intrinsic
limitations in the underlying model, the enforcement mechanism
can deal with only a subset of the AC requests (access to a resource,
role activation, and administrative operation) and events (user au-
thentication) supported by MORRO. Furthermore, the approach
presented in reference [47] does not support usage control.
Other model-driven approaches for policy enforcement have
been presented in [27, 33]. In the approach by Hummer et al. [27],
RBAC policies are written in a domain-specific language based on
UML activity diagrams and mapped to Business Process Execution
Language for Web services (WS-BPEL) specifications to be enforced
at run time; however, this work supports only separation of duty
and binding of duty policies. The work by Martinez et al. [33] deals
with the generation of a PDP infrastructure from a specification
written in a policy language, using ATL model transformations. A
limitation shared by these model-driven approaches is that RBAC
policies are only enforced as a response to a user AC request of
type role activation or access to a resource. Similarly, the work by
Zhang et al. [54] propose an enforcement framework that supports
only delegation and revocation policies.
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Recent work byMargheri et al. [31] proposes a framework for the
specification, analysis, and enforcement of ABAC [25] (attribute-
based access control) policies; RBAC can be seen as a specific case
of ABAC, where role is one of the attributes. In this work, both
AC requests and policies are expressed in a high-level language
called FACPL; they are then translated into constraints to be solved
using an SMT solver. Although this approach is at a high level con-
ceptually similar to ours (both approaches formalize the semantics
of AC policies as constraints, either in OCL or in SMT-LIB), the
underlying AC models are different. As a consequence, the types of
requests and events upon which the policies are enforced are also
different: the FACPL-based framework only supports AC requests
of type access to a resource and does not support the concept of us-
age control. Furthermore, its empirical evaluation considered only
one small case study and randomly generated policies, assessing
scalability only in terms of the number of attributes.
Other proposals deal with the generation of aspects from policy
specifications; the generated aspects are inserted into the applica-
tion to be executed at run time. Mourad et al. [34] propose the use
of BPEL aspects to enforce AC policies in the context of web service
composition. Kallel et al. [29] generate enforcement aspects in As-
pectJ from an RBAC specification written in TemporalZ. Mariscal et
al. [41] introduce a new UML artifact, called role-slice, which is used
to generated aspects. Mustafa et al. [35] propose an authorization
engine in which policies written in a Z specification are translated
into a Java Modeling Language (JML) specification to be checked
by a JML runtime assertion checker.
A limitation shared by all approaches mentioned above is that
they do not adopt the usage control concept, meaning that the
proposed enforcement mechanisms cannot react to changes in the
RBAC configuration.
Other proposals deal with context-based usage control in RBAC.
Kirkpatrick et al. [30] propose a proximity-based enforcementmech-
anism for the GEO-RBAC [10]model using the XACML architecture.
However, this work does not consider role activation as a separate
request; when submitting a request to access a resource, the user has
to specify the role to activate. Although the proposed mechanism
incorporates usage control, only policies supported by the GEO-
RBAC model, i.e., location-based and dynamic SoD on conflicting
roles, are enforced. An authorization framework for enforcing time-
based policies, based on the X-GTRBAC language and its model
GTRBAC [28] has been proposed by Bhatti et al. [12]. Policies writ-
ten in the X-GTRBAC language are enforced using a Java-based GUI
application. Ben David et al. [4] propose a run-time enforcement
mechanism composed of a monitor and a change analyzer. Both
the running system and the RBAC policies are expressed using the
models@runtime paradigm [13] as a running architecture model.
By observing the system behavior, the monitor sends a notification
to the change analyzer whenever a change is detected. Upon this
notification, the change analyzer builds a target architecture model
that will be used to evaluate the RBAC policies. This work is similar
to our enforcement approach as they build a target model to enforce
the RBAC policies. However, this approach was not implemented
and only assignment and activation relations are supported.
Table 3 summarizes to which extent the policy enforcement
approaches discussed above support the various AC requests/events
presented in section 3. As one can see, the MORRO framework
proposed in this paper is the only one that supports all of them.
In addition, none of the approaches discussed above provides
a full support for the comprehensive set of authorization policies
captured by GemRBAC+CTX. Although some approches [12, 27,
29, 30, 33–35, 41, 47, 54] provide a prototype implementation of
their enforcement mechanisms, none of these implementations
are available for a performance comparison; the only exception
is the FACPL framework [31] that, however, supports a differ-
ent AC model. Furthermore, only few of the aforementioned ap-
proaches [27, 31, 33, 47] provide an empirical evaluation assessing
the access decision time; however, we could not compare these
approaches with ours, since the underlying RBAC models and the
application contexts are different.
While in this paper we have addressed the problem of enforcing
AC policies, there is a series of work, orthogonal to ours, that focuses
on testing and static verification of AC policies (and, in some cases,
their implementation), using various techniques such as mutation
testing [11, 32], model-based testing [53], model checking [21, 55],
SAT solving [26], theorem proving [14], and static analysis [50].
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper we presented a model-driven enforcement framework
for policies defined on top of a comprehensive role-based access
control model (GemRBAC+CTX), which leverages the operational-
ization of the access control policies as OCL constraints. We reduce
the problem of making an access decision to checking whether
a system state (from an RBAC point of view) expressed as an in-
stance of the GemRBAC+CTX model satisfies the OCL constraints
corresponding to the RBAC policies to be enforced. Policies are
enforced both when an AC request is made and when an AC event
is triggered; we provide the checking algorithms for both cases.
We implemented the core of our enforcement framework in a tool
calledMORRO and provided an integration strategy for a typical
industrial Web application, following the guidelines of the XACML
standard architecture. The evaluation results show that MORRO
can be adopted without considerably impacting the response time
of aWeb application and thatMORRO scales linearly with respect to
the various parameters characterizing an AC configuration. Overall,
the results confirm the feasibility of using a model-driven approach
to efficiently enforce complex RBAC policies.
Although we considered the GemRBAC+CTXmodel in the appli-
cation of our approach, the latter is generic and does not depend on
GemRBAC+CTX: it can be applied to any other AC model that can
be expressed in UML and whose policies can be expressed in OCL.
As part of future work, we plan to assess the end-to-end perfor-
mance of a system integrating MORRO under different evaluation
settings, such as a production configuration deployed on an elastic
cloud infrastructure. We also plan to optimize MORRO in terms
of time efficiency by adopting cache-based enforcement [24, 52],
and in terms of space efficiency, by adopting the Kevoree Model-
ing Framework (KMF) [22], which is optimized for manipulating
models at run time on large distributed systems.
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